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Liquor Price Affirmation Statutes and the Dormant Commerce
Clause
Long before the days of moonshine and speakeasies, commerce in
intoxicating liquors was subject to extensive regulation. With the de-
mise of the Prohibition era, authority over the production, distribu-
tion, and consumption of liquor was returned to the states.' At the
core of this regulatory authority is section two of the twenty-first
amendment, which prohibits the importation of liquor into any state
"in violation of the laws thereof."'2
Many states, interpreting section two broadly, have enacted stat-
utes intended to minimize the prices distillers may charge distributors.
These statutes require producers to provide state liquor control agen-
cies with schedules of the prices they intend to charge during each
sales period.3 These statutes commonly require distillers to file "price
affirmations," or guarantees, concerning prices. "Affirmation stat-
utes" require producers to guarantee that the price filed for each item
will be at least as low as the price charged for that item anywhere else
in the country during the same specified period. The affirmation may
be prospective, meaning that the affirmation applies to prices charged
concurrently in other states.4 Or, it may be retrospective, linking the
affirmed prices to the prices charged elsewhere the previous month. 5
The enunciated purpose of these statutes is to secure the benefits of
competition in other states for intrastate consumers.6 These statutes
clearly fall within the ambit of state authority under the twenty-first
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI (repealing U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII). Prior to constitutional
prohibition, the states had exercised extensive regulation of liquor, including price-setting. See,
e.g., Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886) (Michigan's tax on shipments of liquor into the
state held discriminatory). The statutes discussed in this Note represent only a small part of the
alcoholic beverage control laws in effect in the various states. State liquor schemes are subject to
federal scrutiny at other levels in the production and distribution process. See, e.g.. 324 Liquor
Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987) (New York's retail price maintenance scheme invalidated
on antitrust grounds); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97 (1980).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2.
3. See, e.g., N.Y. ALco. Bav. CONTr. LAW § 101-b(4) (McKinney 1987) (Each schedule
"shall be filed on or before the twenty-fifth day of each month and the prices and discounts set
forth therein shall become effective on the first day of the second succeeding calendar month and
shall be in effect for such second succeeding calendar month.").
4. See, e.g., N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONT. L.\w § 101-b (McKinney 1987); S.C. CoDi ANN. § 61-
7-100 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (declared unconstitutional in Brown-Forman Corp. v. South Carolina
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commn., 643 F. Supp. 943 (D.S.C. 1986)).
5. See, e.g.. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-253(A) (Supp. 1986).
6. See Brief for Appellant at 24-25, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Li-
quor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986) (No. 84-2030). Extensive state regulation of liquor may have
an inflationary effect upon prices, causing disparities between states. See Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966) (explaining in dicta the aim of affirmation statute to relieve
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amendment. However, such a reading seems to violate the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution, which forbids any state from
regulating commerce taking place beyond its borders. 7 Reading the
two constitutional provisions together, the twenty-first amendment
permits the states to prohibit the importation 8 of alcohol if they so
desire,9 but the commerce clause seems to forbid the extension of the
reach of their alcohol regulations into other states' territories. Affir-
mation statutes extend the states' regulation in this manner.
The concurrent operation of many states' affirmation provisions is
the primary cause of these extraterritorial effects. Within the network
of statutes, producers are virtually unable to change any price in one
state without multistate regulatory approval. Each affirmation statute
requires each producer to certify that its prices are at most equal to the
lowest available in any other state. Additionally, prices once sched-
uled are usually alterable only with regulatory approval. 1° A distiller
who decides to raise a price in one state must raise the price every-
where else during the relevant statutory period or risk sanctions, usu-
ally fines and loss of license. On the other hand, a distiller who wishes
to reduce prices in a given state will be forced to cut them in other
states at some point1 or risk censure under the other states'
provisions. 12
The Supreme Court first considered the validity of liquor price af-
firmation statutes under the dormant commerce clause in 1966. In
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 13 the Court considered the pio-
neering retrospective statute then in effect in New York. After the
Court declined to hold this statute unconstitutional, the affirmation
issue disappeared from the bench for nearly two decades.
In the years after Seagram, many more states adopted the affirma-
tion approach to wholesale liquor price control. Today there exists a
virtually "national system of liquor regulation" in this area, 14 with
upward pressure on prices caused by New York's mandatory minimum price maintenance
statute).
7. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also notes 91-95 infra and accompanying text (discussing
the dormant commerce clause).
8. The terms "importation," "domestic," and "extraterritorial," as used generally in this
Note, relate to state borders rather than international frontiers.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
10. These statutes typically permit changes to the schedule only "for good cause shown."
See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 138, § 25B(d) (1984); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(3)(a)
(McKinney 1987).
11. A distiller must prepare for any price change by coordinating its prices in all of the
affirmation states and complying with all of the requirements of each state's affirmation statute.
See Part III.B infra.
12. For explanation of the mechanics of the statutes and examples of their operation, see Part
L.A infra.
13. 384 U.S. 35, rehg. denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1966).
14. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 5, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New
York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986) (No. 84-2030).
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thirty-nine states having some form of affirmation statute.' 5 As the
practical effects of this network become more onerous, the issue of
these statutes' constitutionality has reemerged. The issue returned to
the Supreme Court in 1983, when the Court affirmed without opinion
a Second Circuit decision' 6 holding unconstitutional Connecticut's
prospective affirmation statute.' 7 Then, in 1986, the Court rejected
New York's prospective affirmation statute in Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority. ' 8 In this action, Brown-
Forman challenged the prospective affirmation statute that succeeded
the retrospective statute upheld in Seagram. '9 The Court concluded
that the law violated the commerce clause because it "directly regu-
lated commerce [in other states]."
'20
While the Supreme Court has thus far found only prospective stat-
utes unconstitutional, 2' this Note argues that all liquor price affirma-
tion statutes violate the commerce clause. The Constitution does not
recognize a distinction between retrospective and prospective affirma-
tion statutes. All affirmation statutes place an impermissible burden
upon interstate commerce and represent an unconstitutional extrater-
ritorial exercise of state legislative power. Although section two of the
twenty-first amendment grants to the states unconstrained authority to
control all aspects of traffic in alcoholic beverages within their respec-
tive borders, it does not give the states carte blanche to set liquor
prices beyond those borders. Therefore, the twenty-first amendment
does not rescue affirmation statutes from a commerce clause violation.
Part I of this Note examines the current state of the law in the
liquor affirmation area. Part II argues that the twenty-first amend-
ment may not be invoked to justify the extraterritorial impact of these
statutes. The amendment does not preempt the commerce clause in
15. See notes 23-27 infra and accompanying text; Brief for Appellant at 5 n.4, Brown -Fornal
(No. 84-2030).
16. United States Brewers Assn. v. Healy, 464 U.S. 909 (1983), affg. 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir.
1982). This decision, invalidating a prospective affirmation statute on commerce clause grounds,
was arguably too fact-specific to be itself dispositive on the prospective statute issue. The Con-
necticut statute dealt with beer rather than distilled spirits and linked Connecticut prices only
with the prices charged in the three adjacent states.
17. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-63b(b) (West Supp. 1987).
18. 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986)
19. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, rehg. denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1966).
New York amended the retrospective statute upheld in Seagram in 1967 to make it dependent
upon prospective prices. 1967 N.Y. Laws 798 (Governor's bill jacket). It had already seen the
constitutional infirmity - an increasing burden on commerce - that a growing affirmation net-
work would present. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Gazzara, 610 F. Supp. 673, 675 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), revd. per curiamn, 800 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986); see Part III infra.
20. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2087.
21. In Brown-Forman the Court did state in dicta that it did "not necessarily attach constitu-
tional significance to the difference between a prospective statute and [a] retrospective statute."
The Court, however, left consideration of the constitutionality of retrospective statutes for an-
other day. Brown-Formnan, 106 S. Ct. at 2087 n.6.
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the liquor area. While it gives the states free rein over liquor inter-
nally, it provides no basis for any extraterritorial projection of liquor
price regulation. Part III considers the commerce clause analysis of
Brown-Forman and argues that any interstate effects of these statutes
will cause them to violate the commerce clause. This section argues
that the prospective-retrospective distinction is constitutionally irrele-
vant, and demonstrates that all variations on the liquor price affirma-
tion theme have practical effects upon interstate commerce. No
distinction based upon the time periods for which the statutes require
national price uniformity is constitutionally sound.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW CONCERNING LIQUOR
AFFIRMATION STATUTES
A. The Operation of Affirmation Statutes
Thirty-nine states have some form of maximum liquor price regu-
lation.22 Of this number, eighteen are so-called "control states" where
the state contracts directly with the producers. Such regulations result
in state control of virtually all aspects of the liquor industry. 23 These
states, in their contracts with producers, often employ a standard pro-
vision called the "Des Moines Warranty" which requires distillers and
brewers to guarantee that they will charge the lowest prices quoted
anywhere else within the United States. 24 Twenty-one other states,
called "affirmation states,"'25 permit producers to set the prices in ac-
cordance with particular regulatory provisions.
26
22. Brief for Appellant at 5 n.4, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030).
23. These eighteen are Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. These states control liquor distribution and sale to varying
degrees through state enterprises, receiving the liquor from distillers and then either selling it
under license to retailers or running state retail stores. Brief for Appellant at 5 n.4, Brown-
Forman (No. 84-2030).
24. Brief for Appellant at 5 n.4, Brown-Fornan (No. 84-2030). These clauses are similar to
"most favored nation" clauses in international trade and demand that the distillers sell liquor to
the state liquor control commission at the lowest price prevailing in the nation. Such provisions
may be impeachable on antitrust grounds. See generally Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 623-24, 637 (1975) (considering the antitrust implications
of a most favored nation clause in a labor contract). This Note does not consider control states'
liquor laws except to note that they conform to the national framework created by affirmation
states. See notes 25-26 infra.
25. They are called "affirmation states" to indicate that they control the prices in a private-
sector marketplace of independent suppliers and sellers through the use of affirmation statutes.
The price effects are similar to those of the control states which control the liquor business in its
entirety. See Brief for Appellant at 5 n.4, Brown-Formnan (No. 84-2030).
26. These states are: Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-253(A) (Supp. 1986)); California
(CAl.. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23673 (West 1985)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-
63b(a) (West Supp. 1987) (declared unconstitutional in United States Brewers Assn. v. Healy,
464 U.S. 909 (1983), affg. 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982) (see Part II.B.2 infra); Delaware (DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 508(a) (1985)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 565.15(1) (1985)); Georgia (GA.
COMP. R. & REGS. r. 560-2-3-.47 (1982)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 281-122, 281-123
(1985)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-1101(a) (1986)); Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
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All affirmation statutes begin by requiring producers to file
monthly schedules listing the prices they will charge distributors in the
state during the upcoming month.27 The statutes then diverge into two
classes. The sole distinguishing characteristic is the time period for
which price comparisons are made. Prospective affirmation statutes,
like the one held unconstitutional in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Authority,28 provide that every producer selling
within the state must append an affirmation to its price schedule. This
document affirms that each price quoted is the lowest price that will be
available anywhere in the United States during the month the schedule
will be in effect. 29 Retrospective affirmation statutes, in contrast, link
each item's scheduled price to the minimum price available anywhere
during the previous month.30 In other words, while both kinds of stat-
utes require the producer to swear to provide the lowest prices, only
prospective statutes fix those prices to out-of-state prices during the
effective month. Retrospective statutes require that the filed prices
will be no higher than the lowest price charged during the previous
month. 31
§ 26:370(b) (West 1975)); Maryland (MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 109(c-1) (1987)); Massachusetts
(MASS. GEN. L. ch. 138, § 25C(a) (1986)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.307(3) (West
Supp. 1987)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 53-170.02, 53-170.03 (1978)); Nevada (NEV. REV.
STAT. § 369.435 (1985)); New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 2-24.5(a)(3) (1980)); New
York (N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(3)(d) (McKinney 1987) (declared unconstitutional
in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986));
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 536.1 (West Supp. 1987)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 3-6-14.1 (1976)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-7-100 (Law Co-op. 1976) (de-
clared unconstitutional in Brown-Forman Corp. v. South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control
Commn., 643 F. Supp. 943 (D.S.C. 1986)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-4-94
(1986)); and Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-202(e)(l)-(3) (1980)).
27. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 138, § 25B(a) (Law. Co-op. 1984): "No brand of alcoholic
beverages shall be sold within the commonwealth to a wholesaler unless schedules ... are filed
with the commission and are then in effect."
28. 106 S. Ct. 2980 (1986).
29. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 565.15(1) (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 281-122, 281-123 (1985);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-6-14.1 (1976).
30. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 4-253(A) (Supp. 1986); see generally Brief for Plaintiff
at 8-9, 12-20, la-34a, Pennsylvania v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 1015 (1985) (No. 101, orig.).
31. See Brown-Forman v. South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commn., 643 F.
Supp. 943, 947 (D.S.C. 1986).
In the South Carolina case involving Brown-Forman, the district court recognized simultane-
ous statutes as a third category of affirmation statutes. See 643 F. Supp. at 947. The South
Carolina court identified the statute at issue in this case, S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-7-100 (Law. Co-
op. 1976), as a simultaneous statute. 643 F. Supp. at 947.
Simultaneous statutes, also called "current" (see Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 3
n.4, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986)
(No. 84-2030)) or "concurrent," represent a subdivision of the prospective category. They essen-
tially retain the future-price orientation of their prospective cousins. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-
7-100 (Law. Co-op 1976) (requiring distillers to affirm that South Carolina prices are no higher
than those charged elsewhere). The difference lies in the distillers' freedom to change prices after
the schedule's effective month has begun. Because a simultaneous statute might neither prohibit
nor restrict mid-month price changes or schedule revisions, this type of statute places a less
restrictive burden on the distillers. Under such a scheme, the filed schedule would be merely
advisory, with the affirmation the backbone of the state's price policy. Cf. N.Y. At co. Bi:v.
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B. The Conflicting Case Law
1. 1966: Seagram Upholds Retrospective Statutes
The Supreme Court, in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter,
32
upheld the retrospective statute existing in New York prior to the en-
actment of the prospective statute invalidated in Brown-Forman.
33
This retrospective statute required producers to file monthly price
schedules with the State Liquor Authority accompanied by an affirma-
tion that the scheduled bottle and case prices were no higher than the
lowest wholesale prices obtainable elsewhere in the United States dur-
ing the preceding month.
34
CONT. LAW § 101-b(3)(a) (McKinney 1987) (the statute the Supreme Court struck down in
Brown-Fornan only permitted mid-month price changes as a matter of discretion of the State
Liquor Authority "for good cause shown"). A simultaneous statute may impose an even looser
regime; instead of requiring a schedule to be filed, the statute may merely insist upon an affirma-
tion that the prices charged at any moment are at that moment equal to or less than the lowest
available. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-7-100 (declared unconstitutional by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of South Carolina) (producer not required to file a price list or to
obtain permission from the South Carolina Alcohol Beverage Control Commission prior to
changing prices). As long as the producer selling in South Carolina keeps its prices as low as the
lowest price charged anywhere else, the producer remains in compliance with the statute.
Brown-Forman, 643 F. Supp. at 947. Under a current statute, purchasers are assured that they
are paying the lowest price available at the instant of purchase rather than at any other arbitrar-
ily selected comparison point. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 3 n.4, Brown-Forman
(No. 84-2030). An amended version of the Connecticut statute declared unconstitutional in
Healy was upheld at the district court level in September 1987. In United States Brewers Assn.
v. Healy, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1334, at 525 (D. Conn. Sept. 11, 1987), the
court held that the change in the statute, which now permits brewers to change prices in other
states during the effective month, no longer violates the commerce clause. The result reached was
opposite that in the South Carolina case, with the court finding the statute "not an excessive
intrusion on commerce." United States Brewers Assn. v. Healy, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA), No. 1334, at 526.
32. 384 U.S. 35, relig. denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1966).
33. N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONT. LAW § 101-b (McKinney 1987). This statute, enacted in 1964,
gave the state cause to fear that its effects would be overly burdensome on commerce (despite its
having been upheld by the Supreme Court), and was duly amended in 1967 to become the pro-
spective statute found unconstitutional in Brown-Forman. 1967 N.Y. Laws 798 § 2.
The retrospective statute's original enactment was largely in response to the recommenda-
tions of the Moreland Commission on the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. "The Commission's
major findings were that New York consumers suffered from serious price discrimination when
compared to liquor consumers in other States and that a severe lack of competition existed in
New York," J.A.J. Liquor Store v. New York State Liquor Auth., 64 N.Y.2d 504, 479 N.E.2d
779, 787 (1984), revd. sub non. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987); see NEw YORK
MORELAND COMMN. ON THE ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Nos. 1-3 (1963); E. BREUER, MORELAND ACT INVESTIGATIONS IN NEW YORK: 1907-1965, at
147 (1965) ("[n]either temperance nor respect for law is promoted by the artificially maintained
high prices."). See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 384 U.S. 39, rehg. denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1966).
The legislature's "ultimate response," Seagram, 384 U.S. at 39, to the Commission's report was
to enact the retrospective statute as part of a comprehensive restructuring of its alcoholic bever-
age control law. 1964 N.Y. LAWS 531 § 9.
34. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(3)(d) to (k), amended by 1967 N.Y. Laws 798.
Sections 101-b(3)(h), (i), (0), and (k) of the 1964 version were not altered when § 101-b(3)(a) was
made prospective. Today § 101-b-3(f) prohibits sales to wholesalers and retailers of brands for
which no affirmation has been filed. Section 101-b-3(g) requires the "lowest price" to reflect all
discounts and other allowances to wholesalers and retailers available anywhere, with the excep-
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In Seagram, wholesalers and importers brought suit against New
York officials for injunctive and declaratory relief 35 that would pro-
hibit enforcement of the new provision. 36 As the statute was not yet in
force, the Court was concerned only with the question of whether the
statute violated the commerce clause on its face. 37 In upholding the
statute, the Court concluded that "the mere fact that [it] is geared to
appellants' pricing policies in other States is not sufficient to invalidate
the statute. As part of its regulatory scheme ... New York may con-
stitutionally insist that liquor prices to domestic wholesalers and re-
tailers be as low as prices offered elsewhere in the country. ' 38
Although the Court was aware that several prospective statutes
and some control states' warranty provisions were already in place, 39
it found that the New York statute on its face created no unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce. 40 The Court held that Seagram
had failed to show decisively the existence of "[t]he serious discrimina-
tory effects [it had] alleged ... on [its] business outside New York"; it
was "by no means clear ... that [the provision] must inevitably pro-
duce higher prices in other States . . . rather than the lower prices
sought for New York."' 41 This finding may be explained largely by the
fact that the statute was not yet in effect. "It will be time enough to
assess the alleged extraterritorial effects ... when a case arises that
clearly presents them."' 42 Therefore the Court found that any possible
burdens upon interstate commerce were "largely matters of
conjecture.
'43
The Court distinguished the case from Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc.,44 a 1935 dormant commerce clause case dealing with New York
milk prices. In Seelig, the Court held unconstitutional a New York
milk pricing provision requiring out-of-state suppliers to adhere to a
price floor equivalent to the in-state minimum price. 45 The Court held
this statute to be discriminatory in both purpose and effect. 46 Looking
tion of state sales taxes and delivery costs. Section 101-b-3(h) and (i) provide for criminal penal-
ties for the filing of false affirmations.
35. As a result of the series of stays granted throughout the pendency of the Seagram litiga-
tion, the 1964 provisions had not yet come into effect. Seagram, 384 U.S. at 41.
36. 1964 N.Y. Laws 531.
37. 384 U.S. at 41.
38. 384 U.S. at 43.
39. 384 U.S. at 43-44.
40. 384 U.S. at 45.
41. 384 U.S. at 43.
42. 384 U.S. at 43.
43. 384 U.S. at 43.
44. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
45. 1933 N.Y. Laws 158; 1934 N.Y. Laws 126 (New York Milk Control Act).
46. Seelig, 294 U.S. at 521-23. New York wanted to protect the Metropolitan Milk District
of New York City and its surrounding communities from outside price competition. Seelig, 294
U.S. at 519, 522.
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to the impact on interstate commerce, the Court found that "[t]he sub-
stance of the provision is that.., there shall be no sale within the state
of milk bought outside unless the price paid to the producers was one
that would be lawful upon a like transaction within the state."'47 By
contrast, the Court in the Seagram declaratory judgment action found
Seagram unable to introduce any evidence showing that the affirma-
tion statute, once in force, would affect prices elsewhere.
48
2. 1983: Healy Rejects Connecticut's Prospective Statute
In Healy v. United States Brewers Association,49 the Court summa-
rily affirmed a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit holding unconstitutional the prospective beer affirma-
tion provisions of the Connecticut Liquor Control Act.50 These provi-
sions required brewers to affirm that the beer prices they filed would be
at least as low as the prices charged in states bordering Connecticut.
51
The district court had granted summary judgment against the brew-
ers, citing Seagram for the proposition that affirmation statutes place
no undue burden upon interstate commerce. 52 On appeal, the Second
Circuit rejected the lower court's conclusion that the statute attempted
only to equalize, rather than to favor, the competitive position of Con-
necticut beer dealers.
5 3
The Second Circuit in Healy based its decision on general dormant
commerce clause principles. It began its analysis with a restatement of
the Seelig proposition that the commerce clause is intended to pro-
mote free trade and "liberate the flow of ... commerce from the pro-
vincialism evident in many local regulations."'54 The court then
considered the balancing process used by the Supreme Court to deter-
mine the validity of a state regulation in light of its intended benefits
and its detriment to interstate commerce.5 5 The court determined that
the burdens of a state regulation on commerce are impermissible if the
regulation's purpose or effect is to control activity taking place entirely
outside the state. In assessing the out-of-state effects, it is the practical
consequences that are relevant. Finally, the court found that the
Supreme Court's construction of the twenty-first amendment makes it
47. Seelig, 294 U.S. at 519.
48. Compare Seagram, 384 U.S. at 43, with Seelig, 294 U.S. at 522-24. See also Brown-For-
man, 106 S. Ct. at 2089 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. 464 U.S. 909 (1983), affg. 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982).
50. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-63a(b), 30-63b(b), 30-63c(b) (West Supp. 1987).
51. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-63(b) (West Supp. 1987).
52. United States Brewers Assn. v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1325 (D. Conn.), reyd., 692
F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982), affd. inein., 464 U.S. 909 (1983).
53. Healy, 692 F.2d at 278.
54. 692 F.2d at 278; see Seelig, 294 U.S. at 522.
55. 692 F.2d at 279. This balancing test is laid down in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137 (1920), discussed at notes 117-30 infra and accompanying text. See generally Part III infra.
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an insufficient basis upon which to permit state regulation of the liquor
traffic outside each respective state's own territory.
Applying these principles to the Connecticut statute, 56 the court
held simply that the beer affirmation provisions were facially invalid
under the commerce clause.57 This violation occurred because the
"obvious effect" of the law, the setting of a minimum price in the three
states bordering Connecticut, was "to control the minimum price that
may be charged by a non-Connecticut brewer to a non-Connecticut
wholesaler in a sale outside of Connecticut. ' 58 The Healy court relied
on the retrospective-prospective distinction in refusing to follow the
Seagram precedent.5
9
While the Healy case marshals all of the relevant commerce clause
and twenty-first amendment principles, the Second Circuit's decision
was based primarily upon the narrow temporal distinction between
retrospective and prospective statutes. The Healy court's clear com-
merce clause reasoning, however, leads logically to a decision contrary
to Seagram. 60
C. Brown-Forman and Its Reasoning Should Apply to All
Affirmation Statutes
In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Au-
thority,6' decided in May 1986, the Supreme Court held that New
York's prospective statute (the successor to the retrospective statute
upheld in Seagram) violated the commerce clause on its face. The 5-3
56. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-63b(b) (West Supp. 1987) provided that each manufac-
turer or out-of-state shipper must affirm at the time of posting its prices, that the price posted for
each item is "no higher than the lowest price at which each such item of beer is sold ... by such
manufacturer or out-of-state shipper to any wholesaler in any state bordering this state."
57. Healy, 692 F.2d at 282.
58. 692 F.2d at 282.
59. 692 F.2d at 282-83.
60. Of course, as a court of appeals decision may not hold contrary to established Supreme
Court precedent, Circuit Judge Kearse had to distinguish Seagram rather than declare it obso-
lete. However, her commerce clause reasoning itself leads more directly to a distinction of Sea-
gram based upon the procedural nature of the action, a suit for declaratory judgment, and the
"'practical effects" question, than to a distinction based on the temporal foci of the statute.
If the Healy situation were compared to Seagram, much of the factual distinction would cut
the opposite way, supporting the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute. First, the Connect-
icut statute applied solely to the prices for beer rather than to all alcoholic beverages. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-63b (West Supp. 1987). Second, its geographical coverage was limited:
the prices filed were required to be as low as the lowest price charged in only the three states
bordering Connecticut. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-63b(b) (West Sup. 1987). Third, its un-
disputed purpose was to increase the volume of beer purchased by Connecticut residents within
the state and thereby increase the state's tax revenues. United States Brewers Assn. v. Healy, 532
F. Supp. 1312, 1316-17 (D. Conn. 1982). This raises a separate issue that brings the statute into
trouble under the twenty-first amendment, since the intent behind it was most obviously not the
promotion of temperance. See notes 67-86 infra and accompanying text.
61. 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986).
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majority62 held that New York had " 'project[ed] its legislation' into
other States, and directly regulated commerce therein, in violation of
Seelig's" prohibition of extraterritorial price-setting 63 and the com-
merce clause.
64
While the Court expressly limited its holding to prospective stat-
utes such as New York's, 65 the reasoning throughout the opinion sup-
ports both an overruling of Seagram and a finding that retrospective
statutes are also unconstitutional. Yet the Brown-Forman Court did
not consider the continuing validity of Seagram and explicitly chose
not to pass judgment on retrospective statutes. The Court declined
either to overrule Seagram or to distinguish it on factual grounds:
"[W]e do not necessarily attach constitutional significance to the dif-
ference between a prospective statute and the retrospective statute at
issue in Seagram. ",
66
The issue the Court left open derives from a narrow temporal dif-
ference between two nearly identical variations of a single statutory
paradigm. The Court's constitutional reasoning in Brown-Forman
does not support this minor distinction as a basis for constitutional
differentiation. The commerce clause principles enunciated in Brown-
Forman and its predecessors mandate the invalidation of all price affir-
mation statutes.
II. THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT REPEAL THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE IN THE LIQUOR REGULATION AREA
The twenty-first amendment does not save affirmation statutes
whose effects are felt across state borders. Section two of the twenty-
first amendment reserves to the states the unabridged right to regulate
or prohibit altogether the importation and distribution of liquor within
their territories. 67 It grants them "virtually complete control over...
62. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun joined the majority but would have had the
court overrule Seagram, the position that this Note adopts. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent and
was joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Brennan did not participate.
63. 106 S. Ct. at 2087 (quoting Seelig, 294 U.S. at 522).
64. 106 S. Ct. at 2084.
65. 106 S. Ct. at 2086 ("a 'prospective' statute such as Connecticut's... or New York's,..
regulates out-of-state transactions in violation of the commerce clause").
66. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2087 n.6. The Court continued:
Indeed, one could argue that the effects of the statute in Seagram do not differ markedly
from the effects of the statute at issue in the present case. If there is a conflict between
today's decision and the Seagram decision, however, there will be time enough to address
that conflict should a case arise involving a retrospective statute. Because no such statute is
before us now, we need not consider the continuing validity of Seagram.
106 S. Ct. at 2087 n.6.
67. Section two of the twenty-first amendment provides: "The transportation or importation
into any State, Territory or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxi-




how to structure the liquor distribution system."' 68 It may not, how-
ever, be used to justify extraterritorial regulation. "Although [section
two] directly qualifies the federal commerce power, ' ' 69 it "has not
given the states plenary and exclusive power to regulate the conduct of
persons doing an interstate liquor business outside their boundaries."
'70
The Supreme Court recently reiterated this principal in 324 Liquor
Corp. v. Duffly: 71 "The court has rejected the view that the twenty-first
amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the commerce clause"
in the alcoholic beverage area.
72
A. The History of the Twenty-first Amendment
No clear consensus is apparent concerning the meaning of the pro-
visions of the twenty-first amendment. 73 However, the Supreme Court
has studied the conflicting legislative history several times, 74 affirming
each time that the amendment has not "repeal[ed]" the commerce
clause in the liquor control area.75 The amendment's sole purpose
may have been to enable states desiring to remain dry after Prohibition
to do S0.76 Or, the purpose may have been that proclaimed by Senator
68. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110
(1980). This proposition has been settled for some time. See, e.g., Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S.
132, 139 (1939) (state regulation of liquor buyers and transportation methods acceptable so long
as affecting only in-state shipments); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939)
(upholding "retaliatory" Missouri statute prohibiting importation of liquor manufactured in a
state that discriminated against Missouri liquors); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control
Commission, 305 U.S. 391 (1939) (same); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938)
(permissible for state to restrict the types of liquor that could be imported from other states);
State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936) (California may impose a
license fee for wholesale importing of beer into the state).
69. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987)
70. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 299 (1945).
71. 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987).
72. 324 Liquor Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 727 (citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp. 377 U.S.
324 (1964)).
73. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 262, 274-75.
74. It did so most recently in 324 Liquor Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 727 n.10 ("we find no...
demonstration of Congressional intent" to confer upon the states complete and exclusive control
over liquor traffic). See also Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984) (resolu-
tion of a conflict between the twenty-first amendment and a state regulation requires a "prag-
matic effort to harmonize state and federal powers" within the context of the issues and interests
at stake in each case (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. at 109)); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1964)
(To draw a conclusion that the twenty-first amendment "repeal[ed]" the commerce clause would
lead to the "patently bizarre and.., demonstrably incorrect conclusion" that Congress no longer
had regulatory authority over intoxicating liquor); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416,
424 n.15 (1946) ("even the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not altogether beyond the reach of
the commerce power").
75. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 331-32; see California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 107 n.10 (1980).
76. Section two incorporated into the federal Constitution two pre-Prohibition federal stat-
utes. These statutes, the Wilson Act of 1890 and the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, were enacted
primarily to permit dry states to protect their liquor regimes from without. The Webb-Kenyon
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Blaine, Senate sponsor of the amendment resolution, "to restore to the
States ... absolute control ... over interstate commerce affecting in-
toxicating liquors."
' "7
Comments on the history fall into two interpretive schools. The
"Federalist" school78 sees the amendment's mandate as limited strictly
to its words: Let dry states remain dry, with Federal assistance.7 9 The
opposite view is taken by the "absolutists," who hold that the amend-
ment is meant to give plenary authority to the States to regulate com-
merce in intoxicating liquors despite the commerce clause.s0 This
view is losing support.8t Because the question appears unresolvable
without reference to Supreme Court pronouncements, "[t]o draw a
conclusion.., that the Twenty-First Amendment has somehow oper-
ated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxi-
cating liquors is concerned would . . . be an absurd
Act's "purpose, and its only purpose, [was] to remove the impediment existing as to the States in
the exercise of their police powers regarding the traffic or control of intoxicating liquors within
their borders." Remarks of Senator Kenyon, co-sponsor of the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, 49
CONG. REC. 707 (1912). The Wilson Act provides in pertinent part that
[a]ll ... intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any State or Territory or remaining
therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or
Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted
in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though
such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory ....
27 U.S.C. § 121 (1982). The Webb-Kenyon Act prohibits "[t]he shipment or transportation...
of any ... intoxicating liquor of any kind from one State, Territory, or District ... into any other
... in violation of any law of such State, Territory, or District .... 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1982).
The incorporation of these two statutes into the amendment only established an insurance
policy for those supporting maintenance of the dry states' right to remain dry. The amendment
was enacted only to prohibit any repeal or subsequent modification of the statutory guarantees.
See 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (remarks of Senator Blaine) ("So, to assure the so-called dry
States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States, it is proposed to write
permanently into the Constitution a prohibition along that line."); Brief of Amicus Curiae The
Wine Institute at 27 n.69, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106
S. Ct. 2080 (1986) (No. 84-2030). But see 49 CONG. REC. 707 (1912) (remarks of Senator Ken-
yon) ("Congress has the absolute power to take intoxicating liquors out of interstate com-
merce"); note 77 infra.
77. 76 CONG. REC. 4143 (1933). See 324 Liquor Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 727 n.10 (expressing
uncertainty concerning legislative history); see also E. BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION (1938).
78. The terms "Federalists" and "absolutists" as applied to the conflicting history of section
2 were used in Case Note, Federal District Court Exempts Interstate Rail Carrier from State Open
Saloon Prohibition: National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Harris, 6 CREIGHTON L. REV. 249
(1972).
79. See 76 CONG. REC. 4168 (1933) (remarks of Senator Fass) (section 2 was designed "to
permit the Federal authority to assist the States that want to be dry to remain dry"); see generally
Case Note, supra note 78, at 252-55; Note, The Effect ofthe Twenty-First Amendment on State
Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1578, 1580 (1975) ("the amend-
ment was designed to allow federal oversight of alcohol in interstate commerce").
80. See Note, COLUM. L. REV., supra note 79, at 1580 (language of section 2 seems unequiv-
ocally to support the states' authority, ignoring any federal restrictions or constitutional
dictates).
81. But see Case Note, supra note 78, at 255. On the "Federalist" - "absolutist" debate, see





The Supreme Court's current interpretation of this muddle places
limits on states' actions under section two. "Doubts about the scope
of the Amendment's authorization notwithstanding, one thing is cer-
tain: The central purpose of the provision was not to empower States
to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition.
' 83
Rather than attempt to state authoritatively the purpose of the amend-
ment, "[i]n determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court has focused primarily on the language of the
provision rather than the history behind it.''84 Although the words of
the amendment by necessity grant regulatory power beyond the mini-
mum required simply to close the state borders to alcohol importa-
tion,8 5 the basic limits of the explicit constitutional grant must be kept
in mind.
86
B. The Twenty-first Amendment Permits No Extraterritorial Effects
of State Liquor Regulation
The twenty-first amendment is limited to exercises of state author-
ity occurring wholly intrastate. The general rule is that a state's exer-
cise of power in the liquor area must fall within the purview of the
"core [section two] power" of the twenty-first amendment.8 7 In the
absence of a justification based upon this permission "directly to regu-
late the sale or use of liquor within its borders[J ... a conflicting
exercise of federal authority may prevail."188 This analysis exposes
82. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1964).
83. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984). See South-Central Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wynnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (commerce clause reflects strong federal procompeti-
tion interests); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (same); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511 (1935) (commerce clause forbids price discrimination based solely on states'
borders).
84. California Retail Liquor Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 107 (1980). This
is an espousal of the Federalist school's interpretation of section two's history. See notes 76-81
supra and accompanying text. See also State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S.
59, 63-64 (1936) (Court declined to consider section two's history, relying instead on its lan-
guage alone).
85. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) ("The twenty-first Amendment sanctions
the right of a State to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without, unfettered
by the Commerce Clause.").
86. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 107.
87. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 713 (1984). See generally Comment,
State Liquor Affirmation Practices: Constitutional and Antitrust Problems, 77 DICK. L. REv. 643,
660-67 (1973).
88. Capital Cities, 467 U.S. at 713 (federal law prohibiting interruption of cable television
signal for public information reasons preempts state interest in promoting temperance by elimi-
nating wine advertisements from in-state cable transmission); see 324 Liquor Corp v. Duffy, 107
S. Ct. 720 (1987) (the twenty-first amendment does not preclude the application of federal anti-
trust law); Midcal, 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (same); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324
U.S. 293 (1945) (same); Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341
(1964) (state cannot impose tax on sealed imported bottles prior to resale within state because of
conflict with export-import clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 2); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
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state regulatory statutes such as affirmation statutes to invalidation if
they have as by-products even relatively minor extraterritorial effects.
For example, although all intrastate liquor traffic may be controlled,
section two does not permit a state to prohibit the shipment of liquor
to a national park located within the state.8 9 Nor may states regulate
liquor under Customs Department bond that is destined for an inter-
national frontier or port within the state.90
III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE PROHIBITS INTERSTATE EFFECTS
OF INTRASTATE LIQUOR REGULATION
A. Affirmation Statutes Are Subject to Dormant
Commerce Clause Scrutiny
Because the twenty-first amendment provides no special protection
for affirmation statutes, these statutes must, survive commerce clause
scrutiny to be constitutional. The commerce clause gives rise to two
classes of claims. The first genre of actions concerns the positive grant
to Congress of the power to enact legislation concerning interstate
commerce. The classic example of this power is the 1824 case of Gib-
bons v. Ogden,91 in which the Supreme Court held that the commerce
clause prohibited New York from controlling steamboat navigation
between New York and New Jersey because such navigation was regu-
lated by existing federal law. In such cases, state and federal enact-
ments conflict directly and are settled in favor of the federal
legislation. The second genre of cases, the class to which challenges to
affirmation statutes belong, is predicated upon the notion that Con-
gress' inaction in certain areas that are considered to fall within the
ambit of interstate commerce is a positive bar to state legislation in
those areas. These cases, employing "dormant commerce
clause"analysis, are the progeny of Cooley v. Board of Wardens.
92
That case established that Congress' silence in an area that "admit[s]
only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation" does not entitle
states to fill the legislative vacuum.93 Rather, individuals are left "to
Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964) (federal import/export policy prevails over state
interest).
89. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
90. Idlewild Bon Voyage Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964). Accord Epstein v. Lordi, 261 F. Supp.
921 (D.N.J. 1966) (New Jersey not permitted to regulate liquor sales to foreign nationals aboard
foreign ships in New Jersey harbor), affd. per curiam, 389 U.S. 29 (1967); Amex Warehouse Co.
v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 224 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (state not
permitted to regulate liquor brought into state, stored, then removed to Mexican frontier, all
while bonded), affd. per curiam, 378 U.S. 124 (1964).
91. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
92. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
93. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319. See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 711, 767
(1945) ("the states may regulate matters which, because of their number and diversity, may never
be adequately dealt with by Congress," but "the states have not been deemed to have authority to
impede ... those phases of the national commerce which, because of the need of national uni-
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their own unrestricted action"; 94 the area is, despite congressional si-
lence, nevertheless still under the exclusive legislative competence of
Congress.
Liquor price affirmation statutes are subject to dormant commerce
clause analysis. The federal legislature has not spoken upon the issue,
but the inequities associated with the interlocking web of inconsistent
obligations and the blatant extraterritorial effects of the statutes re-
quire their invalidation as impermissible extensions of state regulatory
authority into other states.95
The Supreme Court in Brown-Forman recognized that wholly in-
trastate maximum price regulations are generally constitutional in the
absence of any extraterritorial effects. 96 Such purely in-state regula-
tion would be quite acceptable in the case of the alcoholic beverage
industry; intrastate liquor "price stability has long been considered to
be in the interest of temperance and the prevention of chaos in the
liquor traffic."'97 Because of this inherent "public interest," maximum
price legislation frequently has been promoted in the liquor industry
despite the potential for effects across boundaries. Moreover, in "a
variety of cases in areas no more sensitive than that of liquor control,"
the Supreme Court has upheld state maximum price legislation.98
Despite this public interest in liquor regulation, the Court reasoned
that the free trade policy of the commerce clause is thwarted when
states discriminate against or otherwise burden interstate commerce in
formity, demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by [Congress].") (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
94. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 321.
95. Professor Donald Regan analyzes the dormant commerce clause somewhat differently
than the Supreme Court has recently done. In two articles (Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986),
and Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Com-
merce Clause Doctrine; (11) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865 (1987)), he
separates movement of goods cases from other commerce clause jurisprudence and concludes in
the later piece that extraterritoriality is a separate concern, Regan, Siamese Essays at 1873; that
balancing is only appropriate in resolving the question of which of inconsistent regulations
should apply and not in resolving the extraterritoriality question, id. at 1883; and that only pro-
tectionist purpose should be relevant in dormant commerce clause analysis, id. at 1869. This
Note, while recognizing some of the theoretical problems Regan raises, seeks to resolve the affir-
mation statute issue by extension of the Court's reasoning as enunciated in Brown-Forman and its
predecessors.
96. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2085 (1986).
97. Laird & Co. v. Cheney, 196 Kan. 675, 686, 414 P.2d 18, 26 (1966), appeal dismissed, 385
U.S. 371 (1966).
98. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 48, rehg. denied, 384 U.S. 967
(1966). This proposition has not been questioned in some time. See Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F.
Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd. per curiam, 380 U.S. 520 (1965) (statute prohibiting resale of
entrance tickets at overinflated prices valid); Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937) (Geor-
gia statute fixing maximum charges for handling and selling tobacco withstands commerce clause
attack despite fact that nearly all tobacco grown in Georgia is shipped out of the state); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (maximum price legislation for milk survives despite constitu-
tional attack because the business is "affected with public interest").
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liquor. 99 In Brown-Forman, the Court found the New York statute
violated the commerce clause, accepting the distiller's argument that
New York's statute enabled the state to set a national minimum price
for each item sold.100 "When a brand price [was] posted in New York,
[Brown-Forman argued,] that price thereafter [was] thrust upon all
sales made by the supplier outside New York as the minimum."'' 1
This occurred because Brown-Forman first had to apply to New
York's regulatory agency to lower prices in New York before lowering
prices in other states.10 2 Such a national minimum price stifles compe-
tition in interstate liquor commerce. 103 The Court held in Brown-For-
man that while states are free to regulate the prices of liquor within
their own boundaries and may seek low prices for their own resi-
dents, 0 4 they may not project their legislation into other states by
"regulating the price to be paid" for any commodity in those states.105
99. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Epstein v.
Lordi, 261 F. Supp. 921 (D.N.J. 1966), affd. per curiam, 389 U.S. 29 (1967).
100. Brief for Appellant at 15, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030). The Supreme Court did not
explicitly refer to a national price, but did recognize New York's ability to set prices elsewhere.
101. Brief for Appellant at 15, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030).
102. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CoNT. LAW § 101-b(3)(a) (McKinney 1987).
103. Brief for Appellant at 16, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030).
104. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2086.
105. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935). Brown-Forman also argued
that New York's law greatly restricted its freedom to set prices in other states. Brief for Appel-
lant at 15, Brown-Forman (NO. 84-2030). In addition to dictating a virtually national price, New
York's statute, as well as those of other states, treated sales incentive programs - called "promo-
tional allowances" in the industry - so as to make price calculation unreasonable. "Promo-
tional allowances" are price inducements distillers can offer to wholesalers. In the area of
alcoholic beverage sales, the promotional allowances are heavily regulated by the Federal Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) to ensure their compliance with the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-211 (1976). See also Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2083-84
& nn.3, 4; Jurisdictional Statement at 4, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030).
Although every affirmation or warranty statute necessarily includes a provision setting forth
a formula for calculating the prices to file, these provisions vary widely. In New York, all pro-
motional allowances offered in other states were treated as discounts from the prices in those
states. N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONT. LAW § 101-b(3) (McKinney 1987). To determine the out-of-
state price to "beat," the distiller had to subtract all of these "discounts" from the out-of-state
sale price. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(3)(g) (1987) (in determining lowest price,
"appropriate reductions shall be made to reflect all discounts ... and all rebates, free goods,
allowances and other inducements .... ). This was not always as easily accomplished as stated.
Brown-Forman's promotional allowances were not tied to particular products. Rather, they
took the form of general compensation for promotional services furnished to maximize sales of
its entire product line. Brief for Appellant at 6 n.5, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030). The statute
did not provide a provision for allocating such allowances (in this case, cash; see Brown-Forman,
106 S. Ct. at 2083) among the various products the distiller offered. Brief for Appellant at 6 n.5,
Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030).
While requiring their inclusion in the calculations of prices however, New York greatly re-
stricted the use of these types of incentive programs. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-
b(2)(b) (1987) (prohibiting "any discount, rebate, free goods, allowance or other inducement of
any kind whatsoever ...." except for certain specified quantity and prompt-payment amounts).
The inducements New York permitted are largely those mandated by the BATF to insure com-
pliance with the Federal Alcoholic Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-211 (1976). See 27
U.S.C. § 205(b); Jurisdictional Statement at 4, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030).
Thus, Brown-Forman showed that distillers doing business in New York were required to
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Under the commerce clause, states may not base their pricing
schemes solely on interstate price differentials.10 6 Seelig and Brown-
Forman stand for the proposition that no state may force an out-of-
state merchant to "seek regulatory approval in one State before under-
taking a transaction in another." 10 7 The statute in Brown-Forman had
this effect. Just as the milk producers in Seelig were required to pay
Vermont farmers the higher New York prices, the New York statute
constrained distillers from charging lower prices in other states as long
as they continued to offer liquor for sale in New York.
While affirmation statutes are intended less to control other states'
prices than to secure the benefits of national competition for in-state
consumers, "simple economic protectionism" of the type traditionally
proscribed by the commerce clause t08 is not limited to attempts to dis-
criminate against nonlocal merchants. It may also include attempts to
give local consumers an advantage over consumers in other states.'0 9
For example, one state's residents may not be given a preferred right
of access to natural resources located within its borders. 110 Similarly,
reduce their New York prices to reflect the employment in other states of sales incentives which
they were not at liberty to use in New York. New York even required the inclusion of lump-sum
cash allowances not tied to any particular brand. This reduced the comparison prices across the
distillers' entire product line. See Brief for Appellant at 150, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030).
New York's statutory framework stands as an example of the restrictive type of affirmation
scheme. Kansas operates its system in a similar manner, disallowing the promotions but requir-
ing their computation at affirmation time:
[The] price as filed... shall be as low as the lowest price for which the item is sold anywhere
in any state in the continental United States... : Provided, That in determining the lowest
price for which an item of alcoholic liquor is sold in any such state there shall be taken into
consideration all advertising, depletion and promotional allowances and rebates of every
kind whatsoever made to purchasers in such state ....
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-1112 (1986); see also Laird & Co. v. Cheney, 196 Kan. 675, 414 P.2d 18
(1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 371 (1966).
The promotional allowance problem, which the Supreme Court recognized, Brown-Forman,
106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986), forces a distiller to curtail incentive programs in those states in which
promotional discounts are legal to account for their illegality elsewhere. Thus, Brown-Forman
was able to argue successfully that it found itself in a pricing dilemma: it could reduce its New
York prices by the extent of all allowances elsewhere, thereby charging less in New York than
elsewhere and risking loss of license under other states' statutes; or it could discontinue the
promotional allowances offered in other states, effectively raising prices in the rest of the country
to comply with New York's statute. Brown-Forman argued that the abandonment of promo-
tional allowance programs in other states was the most direct infringement upon interstate com-
merce. 106 S. Ct. 2086.
While the promotional allowance dilemma added weight to Brown-Forman's argument, the
Court's holding in Brown-Forman was not dependent on these facts. Instead the Court invali-
dated all prospective statutes similar to New York's. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2086.
106. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935) (a state may not "establish
a wage scale or a scale of prices for use in other states, and ... bar the sale of the products ....
unless the scale has been observed").
107. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2086.
108. 106 S. Ct. at 2085 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
109. 106 S. Ct. at 2085; see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey was
not permitted to keep Philadelphia's rubbish out of New Jersey landfills while continuing to
receive its own residents' effluent).
110. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982).
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the New York milk pricing scheme at issue in Seelig failed because the
statute had the "aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier
against competition with the products of another state." 1  The Court
in Brown-Forman invoked this principle, finding the New York affir-
mation statute abhorrent in part because it was designed to convey
competitive advantages upon consumers in one state that those con-
sumers would not have had in the absence of the affirmation statute.
Such an effect is improper when those advantages are acquired to the
detriment of consumers in other states where the markets might favor
lower prices." 12
B. Assessing State Regulations' Validity Under the Commerce
Clause: Are the Statutes' "Practical Effects" Interstate?
In Brown-Forman, the Supreme Court outlined the dormant com-
merce clause test as developed in recent years. Its reasoning as applied
in that case is applicable to all affirmation statutes, whether prospec-
tive or retrospective. 1 3 In order to invalidate a statute under the dor-
mant commerce clause, its practical effects must be to burden
interstate commerce.'1 4 "The mere fact that state action may have
repercussions beyond state lines is of no judicial significance so long as
the action is not within that domain which the Constitution for-
bids."" 15 Therefore, the analysis requires an inquiry into the practical
111. Seelig, 294 U.S. at 527 (Vermont milk dealers had to surrender their competitive edge in
the New York market).
112. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. 2085; see, eg., United States Brewers Assn. v. Healy, 692
F.2d 227, 282 (2d Cir. 1982). For any given month, when a distiller who had filed an affirmation
in Connecticut sold beer to a wholesaler in Massachusetts, New York, or Rhode Island, it was
forced to surrender any competitive advantage it might have had in the other states and at least
match, if not exceed, the Connecticut price. 692 F.2d at 282; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-
63a(b), 30-63b(b) (West Supp. 1987). States may, however, regulate prices of transactions within
their borders even though there is an out-of-state interest involved. In Schwegmann Bros. Giant
Super Mkts. v. Louisiana Milk Commn., 365 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. La. 1973), affd. mem., 416
U.S. 922 (1974), the price of milk sold within Louisiana was held regulable even though the milk
originated outside Louisiana. Transactions taking place outside the state, however, were outside
Louisiana's regulatory domain. Analogizing to liquor sales, out-of-state distillers selling within a
state are subject to the state's normal controls, while those same distillers' transactions taking
place wholly outside a state are not permissible objects for that state's regulatory authority. See
Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. 2080; see also Schwegmann, 365 F. Supp. at 1156:
There is no constitutional infirmity in a state regulation requiring that purely in-state trans-
actions be governed by the Commission's pricing schedules. This does not constitute a bur-
den on interstate commerce although the product sold within the state and whose selling
price is regulated there, originates outside of the state where it is ultimately sold. But we
further hold that even though Louisiana has the power and the right to regulate the price at
which milk products are sold within the State of Louisiana, it has no power to project its
legislation into Tennessee by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired
there.
Cf Seelig 294 U.S. at 511.
113. See Part I.2.C. supra.
114. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); see also Brown-
Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2086.
115. Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 62 (1940).
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effects of a statute, regardless of its stated purpose."16 If affirmation
statutes have practical effects in other states, they are invalid despite
their articulated purposes of lowering prices for intrastate consumers.
The Court uses the practical effects test it enunciated in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.1 7 to resolve dormant commerce clause questions.
The general rule is: When a state statute "directly regulates or dis-
criminates" 1 18 against interstate commerce, or when its direct effects
are to favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests, the statute will
usually be struck down without further inquiry." 19 When, however,
the statute's out-of-state effects are only indirect, and it regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, the statute will
generally be permitted to stand unless the burden imposed upon inter-
state commerce is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."12
0
No clear line separates the category of direct regulation, "virtually
per se illegal"' 21 under the commerce clause, and the indirect category
subject to the Pike balancing approach.' 22 In any case where an ar-
guably legitimate local interest is present, the question becomes one of
degree. In the balancing approach that follows,1 23 the critical consid-
116. See International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 112 (1910) ("It is the established
doctrine of this Court that a state may not, in any form or under any guise, directly burden the
prosecution of interstate business.").
117. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
118. Brown Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2084 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970)).
119. 106 S. Ct. at 2084; see, eg., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-46 (1982) (Illinois
tender offer regulation directly regulated non-Illinois shareholders); Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey's exclusion of all but its own rubbish from its dumps was direct
burden upon interstate commerce); Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925) (striking
down a North Dakota statute requiring purchasers of wheat, 90% of which is in interstate com-
merce, to, among other things, separate and return the dockage, on the ground that it is a direct
regulation of interstate grain purchases).
120. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S.
440, 443 (1960)).
121. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 145. Professor Regan calls this language "mildly oxymoronic."
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1134 (1986).
122. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2084. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429 (1978).
123. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1959). For a view that the Court only resorts to "balancing" in movement-of-goods cases in-
volving a statute enacted with a protectionist purpose, see Regan, supra note 121, at 1100 ("Once
we have decided a movement-of-goods statute is not protectionist, that is the end of the matter.
The statute should be upheld. There is nothing else to consider and no balancing to be done.").
Regan does not believe that the Court actually "balances" even in those cases in which it
professes to. He argues that the Court should continue to avoid balancing in movement-of-goods
cases. Id. at 1099. Regan noted that the Court in Brown-Forman ran together its anti-protec-
tionism and anti-extraterritorialism considerations. He finds "no hint of balancing" in Brown-
Forman. Id. at 1268-69. The running together of the two analyses is just what this Note argues
has happened to the Pike two-tier test: in all cases, the Court will scrutinize the practical extra-
territorial effects; see note 95 supra.
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erations are the overall effects of the statute on both local and inter-
state activities.12 4 The balancing process is a "pragmatic effort to
harmonize state and federal powers."
12 5
A statute directly repugnant to the commerce clause came to the
Court's attention in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 126 In that case, the Court
struck down an Illinois corporate takeover regulation because of its
sweeping extraterritorial effect. 127 By finding it a direct affront to in-
terstate commerce rather than an indirect regulation, the Court
avoided having to concern itself with the purpose of the regulation.
l2 8
Similarly, the Court found the purpose behind New York's regulation
in Brown-Forman - be it promotion of temperance or promotion of
intrastate competition - to be irrelevant in its analysis. Although
New York's avowed goal was to prevent price discrimination among
retailers, 129 the Court held that New York's prohibition of mid-month
price changes, coupled with the regulatory agency's discretion over
changes upon a showing of good cause, gave New York inappropriate
power over interstate pricing.'30 The statute's practical effects flew in
the face of the commerce clause policy of unfettered interstate
commerce.131
Continuing its assessment of the burden on interstate commerce,
the Court noted that the spread of affirmation statutes since Seagram
compounded the extraterritorial effects of the New York statute. The
Court found that the alleged extraterritorial effects were not simply
124. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; cf Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
125. California Retail Liquor Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 109 (1980), cited
with approval in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 727 (1987).
126. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
127. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982). The regulation at issue required tender offerors
pursuing statutorily defined Illinois-related targets to meet certain requirements in the interest of
shareholder protection. The offeror was required to give 20 days' notice before any tender offer
became effective. The regulation also required the offeror to disclose the terms of the proposed
takeover. The offeror was forbidden to communicate with the target corporation's shareholders
during the statutory time, although the target could disseminate information at will. Only 27%
of the shareholders of the target in this litigation were residents of Illinois. MITE, 457 U.S. at
642.
128. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43. The Court's holding in MITE is derived primarily from
older cases which later became the basis for the direct regulation prong of the Pike test. See, e.g.,
Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., 268 U.S. 186, 199 (1925) ("a state statute which by its necessary
operation directly interferes with or burdens such commerce is a prohibited regulation and inva-
lid, regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted").
129. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 101-b(l), b(2)(a) (McKinney 1987).
130. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2086
n.5, 2087 (1986).
131. Although the Court held that New York's statute directly regulated commerce, Brown-
Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2085-86, the "pragmatic effort to harmonize" formulation of Midcal as
applied in Brown-Forman essentially collapses the distinction between direct and indirect regula-
tion. The Court subjects the statute to the same scrutiny for both categories. See 324 Liquor
Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 727 (1987); Regan, supra note 121.
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"matters of conjecture" as they had been in Seagram. 132 "[T]he
proliferation of state affirmation laws following this Court's decision in
Seagram has greatly multiplied the likelihood that a seller will be sub-
jected to inconsistent obligations in different States."' 33 Despite this
language, though, the Court expressly declined to overrule
Seagram. 1
34
A primary factor leading to "inconsistent obligations in different
states" was the New York statute's prohibition of mid-month price
alterations by dealers except upon a "good cause" demonstration to
the state liquor authority. 135 This restriction was important to the
Court's reasoning that the statute imposed a direct burden on inter-
state commerce. 136 When a statutory scheme exists in which no such
requirement is present, it is unclear whether distillers are free to alter
their prices at any time so long as they remain as low as any offered
elsewhere.
The courts could strike down such a "concurrent" statutory
setup 137 as invalid per se under the direct burdens tier of the Pike anal-
132. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 43, rehg. denied, 383 U.S. 967
(1986).
133. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2087. The language "subjected to inconsistent obligations
in different States" is reminiscent of the "mudflap" case, a classic of movement-of-goods com-
merce clause jurisprudence, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959). In Bibb, the
Court struck down an Illinois statute that required a "contoured" type of rear-fender mud guard
meeting certain specifications to be installed on all trucks and trailers operated on Illinois high-
ways. The statute, enacted in the interests of safety, subjected truckers to inconsistent obliga-
tions in different states: At the Illinois border, trucking concerns were required to replace the
standard mudflaps acceptable elsewhere with mudflaps meeting Illinois' specifications before pro-
ceeding. This was a potentially lengthy procedure, but it was necessary to remain in compliance
with both the Illinois and the virtually universal standard mudflap specifications. Bibb, 359 U.S.
at 524-27. The Court, in a very straightforward opinion, balanced the state's police interest in
promulgating safety regulations with the commerce clause's policy of uninhibited movement of
goods. The latter won out. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 530.
Affirmation statutes are not as simple a matter as the transportation regulation at issue in
Bibb. Although the situations are somewhat analogous, in that both necessitate a weighing of
one state's interests with the goal of unfettered national commercial traffic, the affirmation stat-
utes present a more invidious case. In the mudflap-type case, the statute's effect is not to pre-
scribe conduct occurring wholly out-of-state, but simply to impose a "great burden of delay and
inconvenience on those ... entering or crossing [the regulating state's] territory." Bibb, 359 U.S.
at 529-30. No Illinois law in Bibb required contoured mudflaps on trucks in any other state. The
question was simply one of comparing police power with free commerce. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529-
30.
In affirmation cases, however, the legislature of each affirmation state is projecting its regula-
tory competence into other states, declaring that in order to sell in state A, distillers must set
prices in all other states that are at least equal to those posted in State A. The regulatory projec-
tion becomes even more onerous in the cases of states that impose varied calculi for distillers to
use in determining the "effective prices" their goods carry in each state. See, e.g., Brown-For-
man, 106 S. Ct. at 2087. It is this regulation of transactions in other states that necessitates the
different scrutiny applied to affirmation statutes under the Pike regime.
134. 106 S. Ct. at 2087 n.6; see notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
135. N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONT. LAW § 101-b(3)(a) (McKinney 1987).
136. 106 S. Ct. at 2087.
137. This is the statutory scheme struck down in South Carolina, see Brown-Forman v.
South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commn., 643 F. Supp. 943 (D.S.C. 1986) (holding
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ysis. However, since the direct/indirect line is not clear, the courts
could also apply Pike's second-tier balancing test as explicated in
Brown-Forman. 138 This is demonstrated in Justice Marshall's major-
ity opinion, which goes somewhat further than simply finding New
York's statute facially burdensome on commerce. In arriving at the
decision that the affirmation provision violated the commerce clause
on its face, the Court moved into the second tier of the Pike test and
"centered its inquiry on whether the 'practical effect' " of the law was
to regulate out-of-state transactions. 139 Applying this test in the con-
text of a concurrent statute, the Court would most likely balance the
local interest (low prices for the state's consumers) against the practi-
cal out-of-state impact (a uniform national price, even if alterable at
the distiller's whim). 140
C. Affirmation Statutes' Practical Out-of-State Effects Invalidate
Them Under the Commerce Clause
Because they are subject to numerous affirmation statutes, multi-
state producers are unable to set prices freely throughout the na-
tion. 4 1 To compete in any one state with any prospect of retaining
market share against single-state producers, interstate distillers must
be willing to reduce their prices across the nation, potentially shoul-
dering excessive losses. 142 Because of this effect, which the Supreme
Court arguably recognized in Brown-Forman (as distinct from the bur-
densome results deriving from the New York statute in particular),
liquor price affirmation statutes are intrinsically extraterritorial in
their practical effects.
When the Pike practical effects test, as developed through Brown-
Forman, is applied to liquor price affirmation statutes generally, the
balance hangs heavily in favor of striking them down as a class.
"[T]he putative local benefits"' 143 - avoidance of price discrimination
against in-state consumers'" - are easily outweighed by the "clearly
unconstitutional S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-7-100 (Law. Co-op. 1976)), but accepted most recently in
Connecticut, see note 31 supra and accompanying text.
138. See notes 117-25 supra and accompanying text.
139. Brown-Fornan, 643 F. Supp. at 949. The muddled nature of the demarcation between
direct and indirect burdens for Pike balancing purposes clouds the holding of Brown-Fornan and
supports the South Carolina district court's conclusion.
140. See Part ItI.C infra.
141. Brief for Appellant at 17, Brown-Forman v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct.
2080 (1986) (No. 84-2030).
142. Brief for Appellant at 17, Brown-Fornan (No. 84-2030).
143. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
144. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-251 to 4-252 (Supp. 1986) (entitled "Article 4.
Discrimination in Supplying Spirituous Liquors"); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 138, § 25D (1984) (enti-
tled "Price Discrimination Against Massachusetts Consumers Prohibited"); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340A.307 (West Supp. 1987) (entitled "'Unlawful discrimination").
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excessive"'145 burdens on interstate commerce 46 in all cases. The stat-
utes' practical extraterritorial effects are present regardless of whether
any individual statute is prospective, retrospective, or simultaneous. 147
A distiller's price, once posted in one affirmation or control state, be-
comes the effective minimum in fifty states. Because of the large
number of states with affirmation or warranty provisions, each of
which requires the lowest price available, that low price guaranteed in
one state becomes the price ceiling for all states. Thus there is a fifty-
state minimum price that is also the maximum price allowed in the
thirty-eight affirmation and warranty states. 148 Several hypotheticals
should help to illustrate the great burden this situation places on inter-
state commerce.
First, the affirmation network frustrates its own objects when a
control state is involved. 149 If the alcohol control agency in New
Hampshire, a control (state-owned distribution) state, wished to nego-
tiate down prices charged it by a distiller, affirmation would thwart the
agency's objective. The agency's attempt to secure a lower price in
New Hampshire would fail despite the fact that the agency's action
would be consistent with the purpose behind most affirmation statutes,
the goal of lower prices for the state's consumers. 50 It might make
sense economically for the agency to negotiate prices from a volume
145. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
146. See Brief for Appellant at 17, Brown-Forman (no. 84-2030). The Distillers Somerset
Group Inc. offers evidence of this burden in its brief as amicus curiae in Brown-Forman. Brief of
The Distillers Somerset Group, Inc. as Amicus Curiae [hereinafter Somerset Brief], Brown For-
man (No. 84-2030). At the time it filed its brief, one of its products, Johnnie Walker Black
Scotch Whisky, enjoyed a far stronger competitive position in New York than in California,
where the national leader Chivas Regal dominated. Affirmation laws (New York's, N.Y. ALCO.
BEv. CONT. LAW § 101-b (McKinney 1987) and California's, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23673
(West 1985)) as well as the general national network prevented Somerset from challenging
Chivas Regal in California, since to do so would have forced economically disastrous price cuts
in New York. Somerset Brief at 2, 5, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030). (Although Brown-Forman
struck down New York's statute, this situation still applies whenever an affirmation state is in-
volved.)
The statutes prevent distillers from responding to differing market conditions throughout the
country, including disparate consumer preferences due to climate and demographics. Brief of the
Distilled Spirits Council of the United States, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Brown-Forman (No.
84-2030); Somerset Brief at 5, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030).
147. Brief of the U.S. Brewers Assn., Inc. et aL as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 6-
8, Brown-Forman (No. 84-2030).
148. Each state says that its price must be as low as that offered anywhere else at some
specified point in time. The national floor equals the affirmation state ceiling without regard to
the temporal differences between the statutes.
149. This hypothetical also applies when the "purest" concurrent statute - one like South
Carolina's, consisting of a lowest-price provision only, with no price scheduling required - is
involved. In such states, a very large in-state distributor effectively takes the place of the state
control board. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-7-100 (Law. Co-op. 1976 (declared unconstitu-
tional in Brown-Forman v. South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commn., 643 F. Supp.
943 (D.S.C. 1986)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.307(3) (West Supp. 1987) (prohibiting "contem-
poraneous" sales anywhere else at a lower price).
150. E.g. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b (McKinney 1987).
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manufacturer, given the low costs of doing business inherent in the
control or majority distributorship context. However, the distiller will
not be likely to comply with the agency's request, since to do so would
place a potentially large economic burden upon its operations else-
where. Were the distiller to accept the lower price in New Hampshire,
it would find itself in violation of other states' affirmation laws. Its
action in New Hampshire would entail equivalent price reductions in
every other affirmation and control state in which it does business,
without regard to the commercial realities in those states. Therefore,
the distiller would not be likely to assent to a lower price in New
Hampshire.
In another hypothetical, this time involving both prospective and
retrospective states, the statutes' burdensome effects are again appar-
ent. Affirmation provisions make it impossible for distillers to respond
to market pressures and set their prices in one state without forcing
them to alter their pricing policies in other states.15' Assume that a
distiller sells Brand X both in New Mexico, a prospective state, 152 and
in Arizona, a retrospective state153 during January. Assume further
that the distiller desires to raise the price of Brand X in New Mexico
on February 1. In order to satisfy New Mexico's requirement, the
distiller would also have to raise the price it charges for Brand X in
Arizona on February 1, in order to insure that New Mexico's prospec-
tive statute is not violated by the sale of Brand X at a lower price in
Arizona during February. By raising the price in Arizona on Febru-
ary 1, however, the distiller finds itself in violation of Arizona's retro-
spective statute because the price to be charged in Arizona in
February now exceeds the price that was in effect in New Mexico dur-
ing January. The only alternative open to this hypothetical distiller is
to have determined in December that, in response to market condi-
tions extant only in New Mexico, it would increase the price of Brand
X across the nation on February 1. To comply with the retrospective
statute in Arizona, the distiller would have had to have discontinued
all sales of Brand X in Arizona (and any other retrospective state)
during January. This burden - amounting to a prohibition on sales
in those states - is certainly an excessive burden under the Pike!
Brown-Forman line of reasoning discussed in Part III.A.
151. This hypothetical is drawn from Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Gazzara, 610 F. Supp.
673, 675 n.3. (S.D.N.Y. 1985), revd. per curtain, 800 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986). For the legislative
history behind New York's change from a retrospective to a prospective statutory structure, see
1967 N.Y. Laws 798 (Governor's bill jacket); Somerset Brief at 17-18, Brown-Formnan (No. 84-
2030).
152. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-8A-15 (1987) (distiller must affirm that the New Mexico price is
"no greater than the lowest price at which the item ... is sold ... to any wholesaler anywhere...
or to any state or state agency .... ").
153. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-253 (Supp. 1986) (requiring affirmation that price will be at
least as low as "the lowest price at which such item of liquor was sold ... to any wholesaler
anywhere .... (emphasis added)).
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Were the facts in this hypothetical reversed, and the exigencies of
competition demanded a price increase for Brand X in a retrospective
state such as Arizona, the producer would be required to cease sales of
Brand X in all other states for all of January before introducing its
higher price in Arizona. In short, it is an excessive burden for produ-
cers to comply with prospective and retrospective statutes
simultaneously.
In a third hypothetical state of affairs in which only simultaneous
statutes are involved, the specter of one-month discontinuations of
sales would be eliminated. However, the statutes are still unable to
pass constitutional muster because of the inconsistent treatment of dis-
tiller's posted prices and changes of those prices.1 54 Suppose that the
hypothetical distiller posts January prices of Brand X both in Minne-
sota, which permits mid-month price changes at will, 55 and in Massa-
chusetts, which requires "good cause shown" for any schedule
amendments. 56 If the producer alters the price for Brand X in Min-
nesota, but cannot get regulatory approval in Massachusetts for the
lower price, 157 the distiller will be in violation of Massachusetts' affir-
mation provision since Brand X is now available more cheaply in Min-
nesota. To remain in compliance with Massachusetts' statute, the
distiller will have to refrain until the next month from lowering its
price in Minnesota unless the liquor agency in Massachusetts, exercis-
ing its statutory discretion, permits the price reduction. In this scena-
rio, Massachusetts' statute is unconstitutional. 58 "The protections
afforded by the Commerce Clause cannot be made to depend on the
good grace of a state agency."' 59
Finally, consider a hypothetical involving the determination of the
effective prices in each state. The varying treatments accorded promo-
tional allowances complicate the issue yet further. If a price reduction
in Minnesota, which allows any and all discounts for quantity, 160 were
considered a volume discount in other states, the distiller would be
154. Of course, the burden of a nationally uniform price obtains throughout these hypotheti-
cals and in the national affirmation network as a whole. See note 146 supra.
155. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.307(3) (West Supp. 1987) ("Contemporaneous" price com-
parison requirement indicates an ability to amend posted prices while a schedule is in effect.).
See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 508(f) & (g) (1985) (distiller may amend filed price to con-
form to statutory requirement).
156. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 138, § 25D(c) (1984).
157. A finding that a state agency would be likely to grant the distiller his price-change
request is insufficient to relieve such a "good cause" provision from constitutional disfavor.
Brown-Forman. 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 n.5 (1986) ("New York simply may not force appellant to
seek regulatory approval from New York before it can reduce its prices in another State").
158. So is Minnesota's, but not quite as directly; representative of the least burdensome statu-
tory variation, its indirect burdens are primarily those demonstrated by the evidence at note 146
supra.
159. Brown-Forian, 106 S. Ct. at 2086 n.5.
160. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.312(2) (West Supp. 1987) (permits volume discounts for
lots of up to 300 one-liter bottles).
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forced to reduce the price posted in all of those affirmation states such
as New York that restrict discounts for quantity. 61 This results in
artificially low prices in those states which restrict or prohibit sales
incentives. "By defining the 'effective price' of liquor differently from
other States, [a State] can effectively force [a distiller] to abandon its
promotional allowance program in States in which that program is




In the twenty years since Seagram, the extraterritorial effects of
liquor price affirmation statutes have ceased being "matters of conjec-
ture."' 163 Instead, the interlocking national affirmation system causes
producers of alcoholic beverages to establish a uniform national price
for each item they sell without regard to local conditions. The states'
imposition of significant and onerous burdens on interstate commerce
through these statutes is not protected by the states' power under the
twenty-first amendment to regulate liquor. The demonstrable extra-
territorial effects of these statutes are sufficient to invalidate them
under contemporary commerce clause jurisprudence. Thus, Justice
Blackmun was correct when he pushed for the overruling of Seagram
in Brown-Forman. 164 Seagram, decided before the overlapping and
contradictory statutes had proliferated, is, in Justice Blackmun's
words, "now a relic of the past."'
165
- Ward A. Greenberg
161. N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONT. LAW § 101-b(2)(b) (McKinney 1987) (specifies the amounts of
any quantity discount).
162. Brown-Fornan, 106 S. Ct. at 2087.
163. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 43, rehg. denied, 384 U.S. 967
(1966).
164. 106 S. Ct. at 2088 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see note 62 supra.
165. 106 S. Ct. at 2088 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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